张凌云;齐晔;毛显强;龚梦洁;

• 1:上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院
• 2:清华大学公共管理学院
• 3:北京师范大学环境学院

摘要(Abstract)：

"十三五"以来,在中央环保督察行动实施的背景下,对地方政府环保绩效的考核正在实现从总量考核向质量考核的转型。针对这一重要转型,本文从委托代理激励设计的视角解释了转型发生的制度基础。从激励机制角度看,实施质量考核的难点主要在两方面,即要实现"信息有效"和"激励有效"。实现"信息有效"要克服信息不对称和信息模糊的问题;实现"激励有效"则要建立适度激励,并克服代理人"选择性关注"的问题。针对质量考核难点,本文分析了对实现从总量考核向质量考核转型做出贡献的制度变化,主要包括:(1)环境质量监测部门实现省级垂直管理,保障了质量监测工作不受地方行政干扰,有助于减少信息的不对称性。(2)中央环保督察行动强化了"公众参与",主要体现在两方面:一是地方政府须严格落实群众举报的问题;二是举报问题的整治结果须全面接受群众监督。"公众参与"的强化有助于减少信息的不对称性和模糊性。(3)"党政同责、一岗双责"的新型责任机制纠正了地方环保工作中"权责不一"的问题。地方党委的职责强化,有助于提升地方政府在环保工作上的履职能力。(4)更为严厉的问责机制提高了地方党委和政府决策中"选择性关注"的成本,能有效规避"选择性关注"现象的发生。虽然这些制度调整为质量考核的实施提供了直接基础,但从更深层次来看,上述制度变化发生在一个底层制度变革的大背景下。由于公众参与得到了实质性的强化,环境治理从以政府内部行政考核为基础的管理模式,逐步迈向了以全社会网格化信息为基础的公共治理新阶段。

关键词(KeyWords)： 总量考核;质量考核;制度分析;环境管理;公共治理

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 上海财经大学高校基本科研业务费项目“激励、沟通与监督:中国公共政策的地方执行机制研究”(批准号:2016110059)

作者(Author): 张凌云;齐晔;毛显强;龚梦洁;

Email:

DOI:

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